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COMMENTS
IN RE HOLOCAUST VICTIMS' ASSETS LITIGATION:
DO THE U.S. COURTS HAVE JURISDICTION OVER THE
LAWSUITS FILED BY HOLOCAUST SURVIVORS AGAINST
THE SWISS BANKS?
I. INTRODUCTION
Jacob Friedman remembers making seven different trips from
Romania to Switzerland between 1937 and 1938 to deposit his father's
money into various bank accounts at three Swiss banks. The trips he
took were extremely risky because, at the time, it was illegal for
Romanian citizens to hold foreign accounts. Jacob Friedman's parents
perished in Auschwitz in 1944. In the early 1970s, Jacob Friedman sent
an acquaintance to Zurich to inquire about the money in his father's ac-
counts. Bank Officials at the Union Bank of Switzerland and the Swiss
Bank Corporation told the envoy that they could not identify the Fried-
man accounts without an account number. In 1996, Senate Banking
Chairman Alfonse D'Amato and Jacob Friedman's son, Robert, made
similar inquiries on Jacob Friedman's behalf at the Union Bank of Swit-
zerland and the Swiss Bank Corporation, yet received the same reply.
This story is representative of that of thousands of Holocaust survi-
vors and their heirs who are the rightful owners of Swiss bank accounts
yet have not been able to retrieve their money because they do not have
sufficient documentation. In many cases, family members do not even
know in which bank their relatives or a representative for their families
deposited their assets. In response to Swiss authorities' unwillingness to
return assets, thousands of Holocaust survivors, through two class action
suits, have turned to the U.S. courts for relief.
In October 1996, two lawsuits were filed in U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of New York on behalf of all Holocaust survivors
who have been unable to retrieve their families' assets in Swiss bank ac-
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counts.' In one suit, Friedman, along with four other named plaintiffs, is
suing Union Bank of Switzerland, Swiss Bank Corporation and Credit
Suisse, for an amount to be determined at trial. The Friedman complaint
alleges that Swiss banks have withheld Jewish assets deposited prior to
and during World War II, laundered Nazi regime money, accepted looted
or cloaked assets stolen by the Nazis, accepted profits from Nazi Regime
forced slave laborers and participated in a conspiracy to conceal and pre-
vent the recovery of these assets. 2 In the second suit, Holocaust survivor
Gizella Weisshaus and three other named plaintiffs, also suing for an
amount to be determined at trial, are alleging that the defendant banks
concealed and converted assets deposited in accounts prior to 1946 and
profited from the looting of personal property by the Nazi Regime be-
tween 1933 and 1945. 3 Both complaints ask the defendant banks to dis-
close all looted assets and accounts that existed between 1933 and 1946
and have been dormant since 1946. Friedman's complaint also asks for a
disgorgement of all profits from slave labor held by the Swiss banks, al-
leging that German companies, such as IG Farben, Krupp and Volk-
swagen, used concentration camp workers as slave laborers and deposited
the slave labor profits into Swiss bank accounts.4
A third lawsuit was filed in January 1997 by the World Council of
Orthodox Jewish Communities, Inc. against the same three banks.5 This
class consists mainly of Satmar Hasidic Jews who believe that the Ortho-
dox were not sufficiently represented in the other two class actions.6 All
three suits were consolidated for discovery purposes.7
The threat of litigation has forced the Swiss to respond to the alle-
gations outside the courtroom. On February 5, 1997, Union Bank of
Switzerland, Swiss Bank Corporation and Credit Suisse announced that
1. Friedman v. Union Bank of Switzerland, No. 96-5161 (E.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 21,
1996) (Friedman complaint); Weisshaus v. Union Bank of Switzerland No. 96-4849
(E.D.N.Y. amended complaint filed Jan. 24, 1997) (Weisshaus complaint).
2. Friedman, No. 96-5161, at 1. Friedman originally named the Swiss Bankers As-
sociation as a non-Defendant, co-conspirator. Friedman, No. 96-5161, at 19. See also in-
fra note 32.
3. Weisshaus, No. 96-4849, at 1. Weisshaus named the Swiss Bankers Association as
a Defendant. Weisshaus, No. 96-4849, at 5.
4. Friedman, No. 96-5161, at 49-57.
5. See Jewish Group Files Class Action Naming Swiss Banks, REuTERs FIN. SERVICE,
Jan. 31, 1997, available in LEXIS, World Library, CURNWS File.
6. See Haredi Group Issues Summons to WJRO over Holocaust Assets, JERUSALEM
POST, Apr. 13, 1997, at 12.
7. Weisshaus v. Union Bank of Switzerland, No. 96-5161 (E.D.N.Y. amended com-
plaint filed July 30, 1997) (consolidated with CV-96-4849 and CV 97-461; all three com-
plaints pending under Master Docket No. CV-96-4849) (consolidated complaint).
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they planned to open an account containing $68.9 million as a fund for
Holocaust survivors.8 The Swiss government plans to match the contribu-
tion of the banks and other Swiss businesses and organizations that have
already contributed more than 50 million francs. In response to harsh in-
ternational criticism surrounding Switzerland's wartime role, the Swiss
government proposed, on March 6, 1997, the creation in two years' time
of a humanitarian fund containing $4.7 billion.9 And on July 23, 1997,
Switzerland's major banks published a list of 1756 names of owners of
dormant World War H-era accounts, a number of which belonged to Hol-
ocaust victims.' 0 The list appeared in various international newspapers
and was posted on the Internet." A second list of 14,445 account hold-
ers, including accounts opened by Swiss citizens on behalf of people who
wanted to conceal their identities, was published on October 29, 1997.12
Inside the courtroom, the banks filed several motions to dismiss the
class action litigation in May 1997, primarily arguing that the discovery
process would impede the efforts of a commission, headed by former
Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker, which is currently investigating
the disposition of these World War 1-era accounts.' 3 The banks argued
that the suit would deter Swiss bankers from releasing relevant docu-
ments.' 4 Some sources speculate that the banks published the list of ac-
count holders a few days before the motion to dismiss hearing in the two
lawsuits to divert attention away from the suits.'"
Judge Edward R. Korman heard oral arguments on the banks' mo-
tion to dismiss on July 31, 1997. He had not yet issued a ruling when
this Comment went to press. Judge Korman's questions and remarks dur-
ing the hearing, however, indicated that he would allow parts of the suit
to proceed. Given that the motion is still pending, the reader hopefully
8. See Margaret Studer, Swiss Plan Additional $4.7 Billion Fund In Response to
Criticism of Its War Role, WALL ST. J., Mar. 6, 1997, at A10.
9. Id.
10. See Alan Cowell, Swiss Bank Reports Finding $11 Million More in Unclaimed
Accounts from Wartime, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 1997, at A10.
11. Id.
12. See John M. Goshko, 'Will Money Make Up for Suffering?'; Swiss List of WWII
Accounts Opens Doors to Hope, Uncertainty, WASH. POST, July 26, 1997, at Al; See also
Greg Steinmetz, Skepticism Greets Swiss Banks' Release of Further Lists of Dormant Ac-
counts, WALL ST. J., Oct. 30, 1997, at A18. Advocates for Holocaust survivors criticize
the lists because the banks witheld information on 63,000 accounts each containing less
than $70. Id. According to these adovocates, even small accounts could provide informa-
tion crucial to the investigation. Id.
13. See David Rohde, Judge Weighs Fate of Suit Filed By Jews Against Swiss, N.Y.
TIMEs. Aug. 1, 1997, at A5.
14. Id.
15. Cowell, supra note 10.
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will gain from this Comment an understanding of the initial difficulties
both sides face in addressing certain procedural issues-issues that need
to be resolved before the merits of the case are considered.
This Comment will focus on the class action lawsuits while they are
still in the preliminary stages of litigation. It will address whether plain-
tiffs can clear some procedural hurdles such as various Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b) motions' 6 to dismiss and certain affirmative de-
fenses pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c)' 7 in order to get
to a jury. Part II will provide background information as to what has
happened in Switzerland with these claims since the war and what Swit-
zerland is doing now to appease claimants and preserve its image. Part
Inl of this Comment will discuss the foreseeable problems with subject
matter jurisdiction under § 1331 and § 1350 and predict whether plain-
tiffs can overcome a 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject mat-
ter jurisdiction. Part IV will address the two affirmative defenses of polit-
ical question doctrine and statute of limitations-both of which have
appeared in similar kinds of lawsuits. Finally, this Comment will con-
clude that although it is difficult to predict how a court will respond to
these allegations, whether plaintiffs win the lawsuits might not matter.
Getting the attention of the Swiss banks and forcing Switzerland to reex-
amine its past is long overdue. The negative publicity of a lawsuit can
only help put the issue of what happened to the deposits to rest once and
for all.
II. BACKGROUND
Before relaying the controversial facts, it is important to ask why
these issues are emerging now. There are three explanations for the re-
cent interest. First, the fall of communism in Eastern Europe triggered a
reexamination of the Holocaust because people who were silenced for
many years are now filing reimbursement claims for assets and lost prop-
16. Rule 12(b)(I)-(6) motions are all possible responses to a complaint. These mo-
tions are: 1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, 2) lack of jurisdiction over the
person, 3) improper venue, 4) insufficiency of process, 5) insufficiency of service of pro-
cess, 6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and 7) failure to join a
party under Rule 19. FED. R. Civ. P. 12.
17. Rule 8(c) lists other possible responses to a complaint and allows a defendant to
set forth certain affirmative defenses. The rule lists "accord and satisfaction, arbitration
and award, assumption of risk, contributory negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, duress,
estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud, illegality, injury by fellow servant, laches, li-
cense, payment, release, res judicata, statute of frauds, statute of limitations, waiver, and
any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense." FED. R. Civ. P. 8(c).
[Vol. 21
HOLOCAUST VICTIMS' ASSETS LITIGATION
erty with East Germany. 8 Moscow and Berlin, among other former com-
munist cities, have opened up archives, providing historians with new in-
formation about the war.19 Second, thousands of documents have been
declassified recently at the National Archives, the Treasury Department
and the State Department." Third, the 50th Anniversary of the end of the
war has caught the attention of historians and journalists. Among these
writers are those who wish to reexamine Switzerland's relationship with
the Nazi regime.
Switzerland is known throughout the world for its bank secrecy. In
1934, secrecy laws were enacted to provide the French and Germans
with a tax haven.21 To protect foreign investors from a threatened tax on
Swiss capital, Swiss banks began offering depositors confidential num-
bered accounts. 22 Initially, these laws did end up protecting some Jewish
deposits from the Nazis. Eventually, however, Swiss bankers used these
laws to promote "a smoke screen of secrecy" and to refuse returning as-
sets to Holocaust survivors after the war.23
Swiss behavior toward Jews before the war is consistent with this
theory. In 1933, the Swiss passed a new law denying asylum to Jews
"fleeing from the Nazis as religious rather than "political figures.' "24 To
enforce this new law, the Swiss convinced the Germans to stamp Jewish
passports with a "J" because identifying the Jews among the Germans
seeking entry into Switzerland was too difficult.25 Most obvious was the
agreement with Nazi Germany to turn back Jewish refugees at the border
in 1938. In total, there were at least 30,000 Jews who were turned away
only to face their deaths at the hands of the Gestapo. 26 During the war,
this overt and covert anti-Semitic behavior in Switzerland was masked by
the ongoing need to protect the Swiss identity from the impact of foreign
immigration.
Almost twenty years after the war, the Swiss parliament finally
agreed to set a ten-year period (1962-72) for Swiss banks to track down
the owners of dormant accounts believed to have belonged to Jewish
18. See Nomi Morris, Nazis, Gold-and Justice, MACLEAN'S, Nov. 11, 1996, at 35.
19. Id.
20. See Michael Hirsch, Secret Bankers for the Nazis: A Search for Missing Ac-
counts of Holocaust Victims Lifts the Lid on a Wartime Partnership, NEWSWEEK, June 24,
1996, at 50.
21. Id.
22. See TOM BowER, NAZI GOLD 42-43 (1997).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 21.
25. Id. at 22-23.
26. Id. at 57.
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Holocaust victims." The Swiss processed 7,000 claims by 1974,28 but
only 961 of these were identified with total deposits of nine and a half
million Swiss francs.29 The Friedman complaint correctly states that,
under this 1962 law, there was no outside supervision and, "the Swiss
banks had ultimate decision-making power to control their audit." '30 As a
result, "[In concert, [the banks] deliberately failed to affirmatively abide
by their obligations to identify [the] depositors ... and return such mon-
ies."" Clearly, the 1962 search was not complete since many Holocaust
survivors who had pre-war accounts failed to receive any money. Moreo-
ver, a more recent search by the Swiss Banking Association (SBA),32 in
the spring of 1996, uncovered $32 million in 775 dormant pre-war ac-
counts, held by non-Swiss clients who are both Jewish and non-Jewish. 33
An active participant in the controversy, Edgar Bronfman, Sr., President
of the World Jewish Congress (WJC), called the $32 million estimate "a
bribe," and believes that the Swiss really have billions of dollars in war-
time assets. 34 After all, the SBA did not consider non-cash assets such as
jewelry and gold bars or deposits in insurance or trust companies in ar-
riving at the $32 million figure. 35
Under pressure from various Jewish organizations, in May 1996, the
SBA and several representatives of Jewish organizations jointly set up
the Volcker Commission to look into the claims made by Holocaust sur-
vivors. Paul Volcker hired several Swiss accounting firms to investigate
Swiss bank accounts; the commission has been granted unprecedented ac-
cess.36 The Volcker Commission will focus on searching and returning
27. Friedman v. Union Bank of Switzerland, No. 96-5161, at 60 (E.D.N.Y. filed Oct.
21, 1996).
28. See Morris, supra note 18.
29. See Stephanie Cooke, Digging Up the Past, EUROMONEY, Aug. 1996, at 50.
30. Friedman, No. 96-5161, at 60.
31. Id.
32. In the consolidated complaint, Plaintiffs name the SBA as a Defendant.
Weisshaus v. Union Bank of Switzerland, No. 96-5161 (E.D.N.Y. amended complaint
filed July 30, 1997), at 8. The SBA is "an unincorporated association established in Swit-
zerland whose purpose is to promote the interests of Swiss banking globally." Weisshaus
v. Union Bank of Switzerland No. 96-4849, at 5 (E.D.N.Y. amended complaint filed Jan.
24, 1997). The SBA has filed a motion to dismiss for insufficient service and lack of per-
sonal jurisdiction. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (filed May 15, 1997). See infra note 66.
While the SBA does do some business in the United States, its contacts are not as pro-
nounced as the other three Defendant banks. See Friedman, No. 96-5161, at 17-20.
33. See Bruce W. Nelan, The Goods of Evil, TIME, Oct. 28, 1996, at 54.
34. See Jeffrey Goldberg, Stolen Assets, NEW YORK, Apr. 29, 1996, at 18-19.
35. See Morris, supra note 18.
36. Called to account, ECONOMIST, Nov. 2, 1996, at 5.
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assets in the individual accounts of Holocaust survivors.37
The Swiss banks appointed their own investigator to examine the
claims of Holocaust survivors regarding the dormant accounts in Switzer-
land's banks.3 Known as the Swiss ombudsman, investigator Hanspeter
Hani charges claimants a $250 search fee and, according to Jewish lead-
ers, demands unreasonable documentation in order to trace dormant ac-
counts.39 In November 1996, Hani announced that he found only 11,000
Swiss francs belonging to Holocaust victims or their heirs.4 0 Eight
months later, he identified an additional 10 million Swiss francs in dor-
mant Swiss bank accounts of Holocaust victims. 4'
In addition, an independent panel approved by the Swiss Parliament
in December 1996 plans to conduct a thorough examination of Switzer-
land's wartime financial history. The panel has been given up to five
years to complete its work. It will look into Switzerland's relationship
with the Nazis, focusing on illegal profits, gold and currency transac-
tions.42 The nine-member panel includes an Israeli and the director of the
Holocaust Museum in Washington.4 3
Another active participant, Senator Alfonse D'Amato of New York,
conducted high-profile Senate committee hearings in April 1996, discov-
ering that Switzerland and Poland made a Cold War deal to compensate
Swiss citizens for the Polish land that the communist regime nationalized
using money from Jewish dormant accounts." After hedging, the Swiss
did finally admit to transferring money secretly to Poland. Swiss histo-
rian Peter Hug accuses the Swiss of striking secret deals with other for-
mer communist Eastern European countries as well. 45
Much of Senator D'Amato's ammunition comes from Treasury De-
partment records of Operation Safehaven, a postwar U.S. government in-
telligence operation with the aim of locating and tracking down Nazi as-
sets that were moved into neutral countries like Switzerland. These
37. See Nelan, supra note 33.
38. See Charisse Jones, Survivor Leads Fight For Lost Holocaust Money, N.Y
TIMES, Nov. 12, 1996, at B1.
39. See Dean Foust et al., More Evidence of Hidden Holocaust Cash, BuS.WK., May
6, 1996, at 38.
40. See Norma Cohen, Swiss Bankers Find Further Dormant Funds, FIN. TIMES
(London), July 9, 1997, at 2.
41. Id.
42. See Nelan, supra note 33.
43. See Marcus Kabel, Swiss President Calls Holocaust Claims "Blackmail,"
REUTERS FIN. SERVICE, Dec. 31, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS
File.
44. See Morris, supra note 18.
45. See Jones, supra note 38.
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records suggest that Swiss banks have not disclosed all of their Nazi gold
holdings6 The Swiss did pay out $250 million in gold after the war, but
these records suggest that wartime figures were much higher.47 For exam-
ple, documents reveal that the Nazis shipped over $6 billion pounds of
assets into Switzerland between 1938 and 1945.48 Essentially, documents
show that the Swiss helped the Nazis hoard looted wealth toward the end
of the war, and suggest that the Swiss misled the U.S. government about
how much Nazi gold they had in 1945. In fact, one document contains a
list of 182 accounts held in a single bank which, in today's dollars,
would be worth $29 million.49 Even though the documents support the
view that the Swiss have more money than they are ready to admit, the
disposition of these accounts is unclear.
The difficulty in identifying these accounts arises from the fact that
many Jews opened numbered accounts without names. Others used in-
termediaries to make the deposits for them in order to protect themselves
because it was illegal to deposit money into foreign banks. It is possible
that many intermediaries were dishonest and withdrew the money for
themselves at the end of the war. Thus, tracing money paid in by third
parties may be impossible. Also, it is difficult to trace funds deposited in
banks that have merged or closed, and deposits that have been moved to
banks in other countries.50 Other skeptics question the Volcker Commis-
sion's ability to arrive at exact numbers of funds looted by the Nazis.
Tension between Swiss and Jewish leaders remains high. After
D'Amato and Bronfman proposed creating a $191 million fund as a ges-
ture of "good faith" toward elderly Jews pending the outcome of investi-
gations, and just before Jean-Pascal Delamuraz stepped down from Swit-
zerland's one-year rotating presidency to become economic minister,
Delamuraz rejected the proposal as "blackmail" and as an admission of
46. See Foust et al., supra note 39, at 38.
47. Id.
48. See Daniel Jeffreys, Nazi Gold Trail Turns Fiction Into Fact, INDEP. (London),
Sept. 8, 1996, at 13.
49. See Goldberg, supra note 34, at 19.
50. See Cooke, supra note 29. The Friedman complaint alleges that the Swiss banks
transferred looted assets into concealed accounts in the State of New York through an
agency that the SBC set up in August 1939. The complaint goes on to state that three
years later, Treasury officials began to examine the Swiss agency's funds and records.
"The Treasury Department rioted that the Swiss banks had intentionally and repeatedly
violated U.S. law by its deliberate cloaking of funds and concealment of transactions
from U.S. authorities .... The presence of Swiss bank agencies in the U.S. led U.S. offi-
cials and others to fear the influence of Nazi money hidden in Swiss banks branches in
the U.S." Friedman v. Union Bank of Switzerland, No. 96-5161, at 42 (E.D.N.Y. filed
Oct. 21, 1996).
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guilt.51 His remark angered Jewish leaders who threatened to support
boycotts and class action lawsuits against the SBA. While the banks have
since agreed to set up the fund, they argue that they are not certain how
much of the money in these accounts actually belongs to Jews.
The WJC claims that Switzerland still has $3 billion to $7 billion of
in Jewish accounts.52 It produced a list of names, home cities and depos-
its totaling $13.5 million belonging to 500 account holders who deposited
their money right before the war.53 The list comes from Swiss Bank Cor-
poration's New York City office, and represents only a small portion of
what the Swiss banks held because it only includes funds that were trans-
ferred to New York City in 1941. 54 Credit Suisse and Swiss-America
Corp.'s New York offices have similar records.55 Lists such as the WJC
list were originally handed over to the United States in 1941 because af-
ter the war started, the U.S. government froze the American accounts of
people living in Nazi territory to prevent the Nazis from appropriating
them.56 Of course, it must be determined whether these accounts were
rightfully claimed after the war.
In response to the negative press, the banks are considering taking a
number of actions. Their possible actions include the following: 1) return
money with interest to the rightful owners where bank officials can find
a match, 2) provide compensation where they cannot find any money,
and/or 3) provide a lump sum to Jewish organizations or charities to sat-
isfy the remaining claimants. 57 Should Holocaust victims accept a lump
sum of compensation from Swiss banks now without a full-blown inves-
tigation? Or, should the full truth be known and survivors wait until after
the investigation is complete? Most Holocaust survivors are now in their
seventies and eighties; they do not have a lot of time on their hands and
may want to enjoy whatever compensation they can get immediately. 58
Another point to consider is that the amount of money that the Swiss
government, banks and companies are contemplating distributing to
claimants is much less than what Jewish leaders estimate the banks to re-
ally have. Some plaintiffs will deem the offer insufficient and proceed to
litigate the claims with the hope of achieving justice through the judicial
system. In order for their claims to get to a jury, plaintiffs need to show,
51. See Kabel, supra note 43.
52. See Nelan, supra note 33.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See Morris, supra note 18.
58. See Jeffreys, supra note 48.
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inter alia, that the court has subject matter jurisdiction over the causes of
action.
1I. SURVIVING A RULE 12(B)(1) MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF
SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
The causes of action in Weisshaus and Friedman are mostly based
in contract and fraud.59 Plaintiffs from both suits rest subject matter juris-
diction over defendants on diversity under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), which
states that the district courts "shall have original jurisdiction of all civil
actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of
$75,000 . ..and is between . ..citizens of a state and citizens or sub-
jects of a foreign state." 6 Both lawsuits state that the amount in contro-
versy exceeds $50,000;61 however, they reserve naming an exact figure
until trial. While section 1332(a) grants the federal court power to hear a
claim, it does not create a cause of action for plaintiffs. Plaintiffs must
go on to present enough evidence in order to survive a motion for sum-
mary judgment.62
Friedman rests jurisdiction for additional claims of international
human rights and treaty violations on section 1331,63 the federal question
statute, and 28 U.S.C. § 1350, the Alien Tort Claims Act.64 While this
59. This Comment is limited to an analysis of preliminary issues in the Weisshaus
and Friedman complaints. The Weisshaus complaint lists the following five counts: 1)
breach of contract, 2) accounting, 3) breach of fiduciary duty, 4) conversion and 5) con-
spiracy. Weisshaus v. Union Bank of Switzerland, No. 96-4849, at 12-17 (E.D.N.Y.
amended complaint filed Jan. 24, 1997). The Friedman complaint lists the following
twelve counts: 1) conspiracy to violate and/or complicity in violations of international
law, 2) breach of fiduciary duty, 3) breach of special duty, 4) breach of contract, 5) con-
version, 6) unjust enrichment, 7) negligence, 8) violations of Swiss Federal Banking Law,
9) violations of Swiss Federal Code of Obligations, 10) conspiracy, 11) fraud, and 12)
fraudulent concealment. Friedman v. Union Bank of Switzerland, No. 96-4849, at 84105
(E.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 21, 1996).
60. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (West 1997). It is interesting to note that plaintiffs do not
name the Swiss government as a party. As a result, plaintiffs avoid dealing with the com-
plex Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act.
61. While'the current minimum is $75,000, at the time of the filing of Weisshaus
and Friedman, the amount in controversy under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) only had to exceed
$50,000.
62. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
63. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (West 1997).
64. The Friedman complaint alleges that the Swiss banks committed international
human rights violations, thus presenting a federal question, in addition to various banking
violations and tortious activity. Friedman v. Union Bank of Switzerland, No. 96-5161, at
84-105 (E.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 21, 1996). The Weisshaus complaint, on the other hand, al-
leges banking violations and rests jurisdiction solely on 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Weisshaus v.
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move may not be necessary, plaintiffs' counsel seems to be presenting al-
ternative theories in order to cover all ground. Section 1331 provides that
"[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. '65
While the Friedman complaint alleges that the causes of action for viola-
tions of international treaties and customary international law present a
federal question pursuant to section 1331,66 it remains unclear whether
the claims for violations of international law independently support "aris-
ing under" federal question jurisdiction. Section 1350 states that "[t]he
district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an
alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a
treaty of the United States." This statute may create a cause of action for
plaintiffs if the court follows recent Second Circuit opinions; it does
grant the District Court jurisdiction to hear the claims. Defendant banks
have responded to these alleged human rights and treaty violations under
§§ 1331 and 1350 by filing, inter alia, a 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction.67
Union Bank of Switzerland, No. 96-4849, at 12-18 (E.D.N.Y. amended complaint filed
Jan. 24, 1997).
In Friedman, diversity is present because U.S. citizens are suing foreign entities.
Friedman, No. 96-5161, at 2-6. The foreign plaintiffs cannot sue the banks under this
statute because § 1332 does not cover wholly alien-oriented suits. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332
(West 1997). The non-citizen plaintiffs in Friedman are suing under 28 U.S.C. § 1350
(the Alien Tort Claims Act) (West 1997). Friedman, No. 96-5161, at 5. See infra text ac-
companying notes 128-54.
In Weisshaus, the plaintiffs claim that the district court has supplemental jurisdiction
over non-citizens' claims. Weisshaus, No. 96-4849, at 2. In addition to resting its non-fed-
eral law claims on §1332, the plaintiffs in Friedman allege that the district court has sup-
plemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs' non-federal law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367. Friedman, No. 96-5161, at 4. This jurisdiction relies on whether the claims "de-
rive from a common nucleus of operative fact." United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S.
715, 725 (1966). In making this determination, a court also considers judicial economy
and fairness to the litigants. Id. at 726.
This Comment will not address the potential difficulties in asserting supplemental ju-
risdiction. However, it is worth mentioning that in federal question cases, district courts
have supplemental jurisdiction over claims that form part of the same case or contro-
versy, while in diversity cases, it is up to the court whether to accept supplemental juris-
diction over a claim. The use of the supplemental jurisdiction statute in Weisshaus is less
common.
65. 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
66. See Friedman v. Union Bank of Switzerland, No. 96-5161, at 4-5 (E.D.N.Y. filed
Oct. 21, 1996).
67. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (filed May 15, 1997). On May 15, 1997, the
Swiss banks filed more than 1,000 pages in motions in response to the lawsuits. In short,
the 11 motions are as follows: 1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
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Perhaps the Friedman complaint attempts to use § 1331 as an addi-
tional basis of jurisdiction for its federal law claims in case defendant
banks succeed in destroying diversity jurisdiction. This procedural safe-
guard is interesting to examine in detail as it raises complex international
law issues which other plaintiffs have raised in earlier cases. First, this
section of the paper will examine what federal courts have said regarding
jurisdiction over alleged treaty violations and alleged international law vi-
olations. Second, it will survey claims by non-citizens under the Alien
Tort Claims Act.
A. Violations of U.S. Treaties
A U.S. treaty is a contract with another nation which becomes a law
of the United States under the U.S. Constitution. 68 The issue here be-
comes whether private citizens may sue another entity for alleged treaty
violations. Unless a treaty is self-executing, it does not "confer upon citi-
zens rights which they may enforce in the courts."' 69 Three important
cases hold that plaintiffs cannot base a private right of action under a
U.S. treaty that is not self-executing.
In Dreyfus v. Von Finck,70 a Swiss citizen brought suit in the South-
ern District of New York against German citizens and residents for the
2) motion to dismiss on the basis of forum non conveniens, 3) motion to dismiss on ab-
sention grounds, 4) motion to dismiss international law claims in Friedman and World
Council for failure to state a claim, 5) partial motion to dismiss common law and Swiss
law claims for failure to state a claim, 6) partial motion to dismiss for lack of standing to
sue, 7) motion to dismiss the claims of looted assets and slave labor assets for failure to
join necessary parties, 8) Defendant SBA's motion to dismiss Weisshaus for insufficient
service and lack of personal jurisdiction, 9) motion to strike or require Plaintiffs to make
more definite numerous averments in the complaints, 10) motion to strike punitive dam-
ages, and 11) motion in the alternative to stay all proceedings in these cases. Telephone
interview with Miriam A. Kleiman, Senior Researcher, Cohen, Milstien, Hausfeld & Toll,
P.L.L.C. (Oct. 13, 1997).
68. "[A]I1 treaties made ...under the authority of the United States, shall be the
supreme law of the land." U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
69. Diggs v. Dent, 14 I.L.M. 797, 804 (1975). In Diggs, plaintiffs asked the court to
declare that defendant Dent's dealings with the South African government, through the
importation of seal skins from South African-occupied Namibia, violate the United Na-
tions Charter. Id. at 797. The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia held that
the provisions of the United Nations Charter were not self-executing and thus plaintiffs
could not assert any individual legal rights in court. Id. at 804. For a discussion on how
the self-executing/non-self-executing distinction emerged, see Natale V. DiNatale, Recent
Development: Chaos in the Aftermath of the Panama Invasion---Constitutional Law Impli-
cations of an Action for Damages Arising From a Treaty Violation: Industria Panifi-
cadora, S.A. v. United States, 8 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 399, 402-04 (Spring 1994).
70. 534 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1976).
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wrongful confiscation of property in Nazi Germany in 1938. 71 The plain-
tiff, a Jew and former resident of Germany, was forced to emigrate to
Switzerland and sell to defendants his interest in a banking firm at a
price that was $1.5 million below its actual value.72 After the war, the
parties came to a settlement agreement; however, defendants allegedly
never reimbursed plaintiff.73 In 1951, defendants did pay plaintiff 490,000
German marks pursuant to a second settlement agreement. 74 Plaintiff then
sued defendant for the original taking of his property and for defendant's
alleged repudiation of the first settlement agreement. 75 He alleged federal
jurisdiction in part under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, claiming that the defendant
violated various treaties to which the United States was a party. The
plaintiff relied on the Hague Convention,76 the Kellogg-Briand Peace
Pact,77 the Versailles Treaty,78 and the Four Power Occupation
Agreement.79
The court held "that none of these [treaties] dealt with the expropri-
ation by Germans of the property of German citizens, and none conferred
any- private rights with regard to such property that were enforceable in
American courts."' 0 Essentially, there was no private right of recovery
under any of the treaties for defendants' allegedly tortious conduct. The
court stated that treaties rarely contain provisions that confer private
rights upon citizens of one of the contracting parties.8' More specifically,
"Rarely is the relationship between a private claim and a general treaty
sufficiently direct so that it may be said to 'arise under' the treaty as re-
quired by art. I1, § 2, cl. 1 of the Constitution. 8 s2
71. Id.
72. Id. at 26.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Convention between the United States and other Powers respecting the laws and
customs of war on land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277 thereinafter Hague Convention] (at-
tempted to impose standards of conduct for belligerent nations).
77. Treaty between the United States and other Powers providing for the renuncia-
tion of war as an instrument of national policy, Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343.
78. Treaty of Peace between the United States and Germany, Aug. 25, 1921, U.S.-
Germany, 42 Stat. 1939 (provided a reparations and war crimes compact following
WWI).
79. Agreement on Control Machinery in Germany, May 1, 1945, 5 U.S.T. 2062
(provided for the joint occupation and control of Germany by the conquering nations dur-
ing the period of surrender).
80. Dreyfus, 534 F.2d at 30.
81. Id. at 29.
82. Id. at 29-30 (quoting 13 CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT Er AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE § 3563 (1975)).
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Cases since Dreyfus distinguish between self-executing and non-self-
executing treaties. A self-executing treaty is one which does not require
another piece of legislation to set it into motion. An individual may en-
force such a treaty because the treaty expressly or impliedly provides a
private right of action. s3 In Handel v. Artukovic, s4 the court listed four
factors in determining if a treaty is self-executing, thus establishing af-
firmative obligations without the need for implementing legislation: "(1)
the purposes of the treaty and the objectives of its creators, (2) the exis-
tence of domestic procedures and institutions appropriate for direct im-
plementation, (3) the availability and feasibility of alternative enforce-
ment methods and (4) the immediate and long-range social consequences
of self- or non-self-execution. ' a5 The plaintiffs in Handel brought a class
action suit against defendant for his alleged involvement in deprivations
of life and property of Jews in former Yugoslavia during World War 11.86
Plaintiffs relied on two treaties: the Geneva Convention 7 and the Hague
Convention.88 The court held that the signatory countries of the Geneva
Convention specifically provided for implementation through municipal
law and thus did not intend for the treaty to be self-executing. 9 As for
the Hague Convention, although there is no provision for implementation
through municipal law, the court held that it was not a source of rights
enforceable by a litigant in a domestic court,90 for various policy reasons
outlined in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic.91
In Tel-Oren, survivors and representatives of people killed in a ter-
rorist attack on a bus in Israel unsuccessfully sued the Libyan Arab Re-
public, the Palestine Liberation Organization and various other terrorist
organizations for damages arising from tortious acts in violation of trea-
ties and customary international law.92 The U.S. District Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia unanimously affirmed the dismissal of the
alleged violations, but wrote three different opinions. Judge Bork's con-
currence addressed treaty violations in detail.
83. Id. at 30.
84. 601 F. Supp. 1421 (C.D. Cal. 1985).
85. Id. at 1425 (quoting People of Saipan v. Department of Interior, 502 R2d 90, 97
(9th Cir. 1974)).
86. Id. at 1424.
87. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316.
88. Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907,
36 Stat. 2277.
89. Handel, 601 F. Supp. at 1425.
90. Id.
91. 726 F.2d 775, 810 (D.C.Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring).
92. Id. at 774 (Edwards, J., concurring).
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The Plaintiffs alleged that defendants violated thirteen treaties. 93
Bork stated that only the first five alleged treaties were binding on the
United States and therefore the remaining eight could not provide a basis
for jurisdiction because Count III of the complaint alleged tortious ac-
tions in violation of the treaties of the United States.94 Moreover, of the
first five treaties to which the U.S. was a party, none provided plaintiffs
with a cause of action.95 The Geneva Convention for the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War, the Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War, and the OAS Convention to Prevent and
Punish Acts of Terrorism expressly call for implementing legislation. 96
The party states would have to take action through their own laws to en-
force these treaties because they are not self-executing. Likewise, Articles
I and II of the United Nations Charter are not self-executing because
they imposes obligations on nations and do not speak in terms of individ-
ual rights.97
93. Id. at 808-10 (Bork, J., concurring). The complaint listed the thirteen treaties as
follows: Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516; Articles I and 2 of the Charter of the United Nations,
June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031; Convention With Respect to the Laws and Customs of War
and Land, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803 and Convention Respecting the Laws and Cus-
toms of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277 (Hague Conventions); Geneva Con-
vention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316;
Convention to Prevent and Punish the Acts of Terrorism Taking the Forms of Crime
Against Persons and Related Extortion That Are of International Significance, Feb. 2,
1971, 27 U.S.T. 3949 (Organization of American States (OAS) Convention); Protocols I
and II to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, June 7, 1977 and Diplomatic Con-
ference on Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable
in Armed Conflict, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1391, 1442 (1977); Declaration on Principles
of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in
Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, F.A.Res. 2625, 25 U.N.GAOR Supp.
(No. 28) at 121, U.N.Doc. A/8028 (1970); Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
G.A.Res. 217, U.N. 3 GAOR, U.N.Doc. 1/777 (1948); International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, Annex to G.A.Res. 2200, 21 U.N.GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52,
U.N.Doc. A/6316 (1966); Basic Principles for the Protection of Civilian Populations in
Armed Conflicts, G.A.Res. 2675, 25 U.N.GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 76, U.N. Doc. A/8028
(1970); Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime and Genocide, Dec.
9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277; Declaration of the Rights of the Child, G.A.Res. 1386, 14
U.N.GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 19, U.N. Doc. A/4354 (1959); and American Convention
on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S. Official Records OEA.Ser. K/XVI/1.1, Doc.
65, Rev. 1, Corr. 1, reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 101 (1970).
94. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 809.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.; see also Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24, 30 (2d Cir. 1976).
1997]
266 MD. JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & TRADE
Bork noted that the fifth treaty listed in the Tel-Oren complaint, the
Hague Convention, similarly does not afford individuals a private right of
action. 98 Bork reasoned that although the Hague Convention contains no
language calling for implementing legislation, it "[has] never been re-
garded as law private parties could enforce." 99 His main concern was
that giving individuals who thought their rights under the Hague Conven-
tion were violated a private right of action would open the floodgates. As
the Handel court put it: "Recognition of a private remedy under the
Convention would create insurmountable problems for the legal system
that attempted it; would potentially interfere with foreign relations; and
would pose serious problems of fairness in enforcement.' °0 Hence, there
are no cases holding that the Hague Convention provided a private right
to sue. 01
Applying the analysis from these earlier cases to Friedman, it seems
unlikely that a court will look favorably upon plaintiffs alleged treaty vi-
olations under § 1331-the major obstacle being that private individuals
do not have a private right to sue under an alleged treaty violation unless
the treaty is self-executing. The Friedman complaint alleges, in much de-
tail, that the Swiss banks, in conspiring with the Nazis, actively assisted
the war objectives of the Nazi regime1 °2 The complaint states that by
conspiring with the Nazis in order to profit from the Nazi regime's act of
looting and enforcing slave labor, the Swiss banks violated numerous in-
ternational treaties, customary international laws and fundamental human
rights laws prohibiting genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity,
crimes against peace, slavery, slave and forced labor and slave trade. 03
Whether these allegations are stfficient to withstand a motion to dismiss
remains to be seen.
98. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 810.
99. Id.
100. Handel v. Artukovic, 601 F. Supp. 1421, 1425 (C.D.Cal. 1985).
101. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 810 (Bork, J., concurring).
102. Friedman, No. 96-5161, at 86.
103. Id. The complaint lists the following treaties and agreements without citations:
the Genocide Convention, the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, the Geneva Convention of 1929, the supplemental Geneva Convention on
the Treatment of Non-Combatants During War Time, the Nurenberg Principles, the Slav-
ery Convention of 1926, the Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the
Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, the International Labor
Conventions and Recommendations, the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the Hague Convention of 1907.
Id. Seven of these agreements were used and unfavorably ruled upon in Dreyfus v. Von
Finck, Handel v. Artukovic and Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic.
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If a court finds that at least one of the treaties listed in the Friedman
complaint to be self-executing, the next step is actually proving that the
defendant banks' committed the violations. The banks' roles in these al-
leged treaty violations is one step removed from the Nazi regime's. The
issue then becomes whether a court will find that indirectly aiding and
abetting the Nazis to commit war crimes by storing looted assets in their
coffers violates a treaty to which the U.S. is a party. A court will proba-
bly not make this determination as treaties do not usually provide private
individuals with a right to sue.
B. Violations of Customary International Law
Unlike treaties, which establish both obligations and the extent to
which they shall be enforceable, the law of nations enables each state to
make an independent judgment as to the extent and method of enforcing
internationally recognized norms.' 4 Courts have split as to whether viola-
tions of international law (or the law of nations) confer a private right of
action.
One view is that international law does not provide a civil action to
each member of the community. In addition to finding that violations of
four different treaties did not create a private right of action, the court in
Handel v. Artukovic also ruled that plaintiffs could not infer a right of ac-
tion from the law of nations, either.105 The court stated that "while inter-
national law may provide the substantive rule of law in a given situation,
the enforcement of international law is left to the individual states. ' 106
According to the Handel court, the state reserves the power to enforce
international laws. The practical reason for giving states exclusive power
is so that there is some sort of consensus on what international law
includes.Y°
Likewise, the court in Dreyfus v. Von Finck dismissed the notion
that that the seizure of individual property and defendants' allegedly
wrongful repudiation of the 1948 settlement agreement were torts which
violated the law of nations. 08 In dicta, the court stated that the law of
nations dealt primarily with the relationship among nations rather than
among individuals.'0 9 Like a general treaty, the law of nations was held
104. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 778 n.2 (stating that 'a treaty and the law of nations are
entirely different animals.") (Edwards, J., concurring).
105. 601 F. Supp. 1421 (C.D.Cal. 1985).
106. Id. at 1427.
107. Id.
108. Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24, 30 (2d Cir. 1976).
109. Id. at 30-31.
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not to be self-executing so as to vest a plaintiff with individual legal
rights.
Other courts have permitted suits based on alleged violations of the
law of nations to proceed. In Forti v. Suarez-Mason,"0 the court held that
Argentine citizens alleging violations of international law by a former
Argentine general through torture, murder and prolonged detention had
adequately pleaded federal question jurisdiction."' Relying on the stan-
dard that the Ninth Circuit used in Republic of Philippines v. Marcos"2
that the claim must arise under the Constitution or laws of the United
States and must not be unsubstantial or frivolous, the Forti court held
that it could entertain plaintiffs' international law claims pursuant to
§ 1331 and deny defendant's motion to dismiss. 1 3
In Kadic v. Karadzic,"4 the court refused to go that far. Plaintiffs in
Kadic sued the self-proclaimed President of the unrecognized Bosnian-
Serb republic, alleging that he engaged in genocide, war crimes and other
instances of violence such as murder, torture and degrading treatment." 5
Plaintiffs argued that § 1331 provided an independent basis for subject
matter jurisdiction over all claims alleging violations of international law
and relied on the settled proposition that federal common law incorpo-
rates international law. 16 The Kadic court chose not to address the issue
because both the Alien Tort Claims Act" 7 and the Torture Prevention
Victim Act"8 supplied plaintiffs with a remedy for their allegations. The
court did note that while Tel-Oren held that the law of nations generally
does not create private causes of action, some district courts, such as
Forti, have upheld § 1331 jurisdiction for international law violations.
The Second Circuit in both Kadic and in another case-Filartiga v.
Pefia-Irala' 9-refrained from ruling definitively on whether any cause of
action based in international law violations could rely on § 1331 jurisdic-
tion for the sole reason that plaintiffs had other statutes on which to base
their claims.
110. 672 F. Supp. 1531 (N.D.Cal. 1987), reh'g granted, 694 F. Supp. 707 (N.D.Cal.
1988).
111. Forti, 672 F. Supp. at 1543.
112. 818 F.2d 1473 (9th Cir. 1987).
113. Forti, 672 F. Supp. at 1544.
114. 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
115. Id.
116. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 246.
117. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (West 1997).
118. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73
(1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350).
119. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). See infra text accompanying notes 129-32.
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Thus, in the words of the recent Xuncax v. Gramajol2 ° decision, the
question of whether claims for violations of international law might inde-
pendently support "arising under" federal question jurisdiction through
§ 1331 remains unresolved.' 21 According to Xuncax, in the absence of
legislation providing a private right of action of the kind found in the
Alien Tort Claims Act discussed infra, federal courts should not imply a
private right of action from § 1331.122
It is well-settled that federal common law has incorporated princi-
ples of customary international law. 123 Many courts, however, have held
that because international law is not a source of a private right of action,
a plaintiff's claims for human rights violations cannot ordinarily "arise
under" federal common law.124 Thus, § 1331 cannot support jurisdiction
over such claims. 1' 5 If, in our case, a court rules that it does have subject
matter jurisdiction pursuant to either §§ 1331 or 1332, in order to impose
liability, it would have to find first, that the banks looted and cloaked
Jewish assets, and second, that the banks' activities aided and abetted the
Nazis to commit human rights violations. 126
While the court will probably dismiss the counts alleging treaty vio-
lations, it is difficult to predict whether it will allow the claims alleging
international law violations to proceed. If the court decides to stretch the
holdings in Filartiga and Kadic by allowing United States citizens to
bring claims for international human rights violations under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331, it will create new law for the Second Circuit. If it dismisses the
allegations concerning human rights violations, the court may still permit
the violations based in contract law to continue at this point, as long as
plaintiffs' claims survive other challenges such as lack of diversity, fail-
120. 886 F. Supp. 162 (D.Mass. 1995) (holding that defendant was liable for expa-
triate Guatemalan citizens' injuries suffered at the hands of Guatemalan military forces).
121. Id. at 193.
122. Id. at 194.
123. Id. at 193.
124. Id. at 194.
125. See, e.g., Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1175 (D.C.Cir.
1994); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 779 n.4 (D.C.Cir. 1984) (Ed-
wards, J., concurring), aff'g 517 F. Supp. 542 (D.D.C. 1981); Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534
F.2d 24, 28 (2d Cir. 1976); Handel v. Artukovic, 601 F. Supp. 1421, 1426 (C.D.Cal.
1985); see also RESTATEmENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 702, 703 (1987).
Section 702 states that "A state violates international law if... it practices, encourages
or condones genocide, slavery or slave trade, the murder or causing the disappearance of
individuals, torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, pro-
longed arbitrary detention, systematic racial discrimination, or a consistent pattern of
gross violations of internationally recognized human rights." Id. (emphasis added)
126. There are numerous difficulties with actually proving the merits of the
claims-a discussion for another paper.
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ure to state a claim or lack of standing to sue. 127
C. Noncitizen Plaintiffs Rest Jurisdiction on § 1350: The Alien Tort
Claims Act
In the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress provided for federal jurisdic-
tion over suits by aliens involving principles of international law. While
there is a lack of consensus among the judicial circuits that have inter-
preted § 1350,121 most are agree that the Alien Tort Claims Act grants
federal courts jurisdiction to decide whether noncitizens can maintain a
private cause of action. Unlike § 1331 which requires that an action
"arise under" the laws or a treaty of the United States, § 1350 only
mandates a "violation of the law of nations" in order to confer original
jurisdiction on district courts.
The seminal case discussing the Alien Tort Claims Act is Filartiga
v. Pefla-Irala.'29 Dolly Filartiga and her father sued the former Inspector
General of the police in Asuncion, Paraguay for the wrongful death of
their son, alleging that defendant had kidnaped and tortured him to death
in Paraguay. 30 The question before the Filartiga court was whether the
conduct alleged in fact violated the law of nations. In pleading their case,
the Filartigas produced numerous affidavits of international legal scholars
who stated unanimously that torture was a recognized violation of the
law of nations. Plaintiffs did not allege U.S. treaty violations, but relied
on treaties and international agreements as evidence of "an emerging
norm of customary international law rather than independent sources of
law.'1'3 The court held that there was subject matter jurisdiction over
their claims because deliberate torture violated universally accepted
norms of the international law of human rights-numerous international
agreements condemn and almost all nations renounce the practice of
torture. 132
Thus, defendant's alleged violation must be a "well-established, uni-
versally recognized [norm] of international law" for federal jurisdiction
to exist under the Alien Tort Claims Act. 13 3 Before a generally recog-
nized wrong becomes an international law violation within the meaning
127. See supra note 67.
128. Section § 1350 states: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of
any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations
or a treaty of the United States."
129. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
130. Id. at 878.
131. Id. at 880 n.7.
132. Id. at 880.
133. Id. at 888.
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of the statute, the nations of the world must demonstrate that the viola-
tion is of mutual, and not merely several, concern, by means of express
international accords. 34 For example, in Jafari v. Islamic Republic of
Iran,135 §1350 did not confer jurisdiction over the Iranian nationals' suit
because Iran did not violate any U.S. treaties and "the law of nations"
did not prohibit a government from expropriating its own citizens' prop-
erty. Similarly, Dreyfius v. Von Finck136 held that the Nazi seizure of the
plaintiff's interest in a banking firm did not violate the law of nations
and therefore could not create an action under §1350.137
Courts since Filartiga have held that § 1350 provides both a private
cause of action and a federal forum for aliens who seek remedies for vio-
lations related to torture, genocide and other war crimes. 13 In Paul v.
Avril, 139 six Haitian nationals sued the former head of the Haitian military
for alleged torture, cruel inhuman or degrading treatment, arbitrary deten-
tion and other violations of customary international law.' 40 The court held
that the plain language of § 1350, especially the words "committed in vi-
olation," strongly suggest that a well-pled tort would be sufficient to pro-
vide a jurisdictional basis and a private right of action.141
In Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litigation,142 the
Ninth Circuit joined the Second Circuit in concluding that the Alien Tort
Claims Act creates a cause of action for violations of specific, universal
and obligatory international human rights standards. 4 The numerous
lawsuits filed by Philippinos against former Philippine President Ferdi-
nand Marcos allege damages resulting from torture, summary execution
and other human rights abuses. The Ninth Circuit was willing to imply a
cause of action under § 1350.
Following Filartiga and In re Marcos, the Second Circuit in Kadic
held that the leader of the Bosnian-Serb forces could be held accountable
for acts of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity under
§ 1350 regardless if he was acting under color of state law or as a pri-
134. Id.
135. 539 F. Supp. 209 (N.D.Ill. 1982).
136. 534 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1976).
137. Id. at 30-31. See also HT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975)
("We cannot subscribe to plaintiffs' view that the Eighth Commandment 'Thou shalt not
steal' is part of the law of nations.").
138. See In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litigation, 25 F.3d 1467,
1473 (9th Cir. 1994); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 238 (2d Cir. 1995).
139. 812 F. Supp. 207 (S.D.Fla. 1993).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 212.
142. 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1994).
143. See id. at 1475.
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vate individual.'" The Kadic court opined that § 1350 provides both ju-
risdiction and a private cause of action. Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit
held that it had subject matter jurisdiction and plaintiffs could maintain
their cause of action under § 1350 over a suit brought by former prison-
ers in Ethiopia against an official of the former Ethiopian government
charging him with torturing them and committing other cruel acts. 145 And
a district court in Manhattan ruled that plaintiffs, who were representing
relatives who died at the hands of defendant, a former political leader in
Rwanda involved in torturing and killing thousands of Tutsis and moder-
ate members of the Hutu majority, could maintain a cause of action
under § 1350.'4
These cases indicate an emerging trend to allow civil suits under
§ 1350 to proceed in federal district court for injustice that occurs
abroad. Compared to § 1331, it seems that it is easier to obtain jurisdic-
tion under § 1350 when alleging a violation of international law. How-
ever, Kadic, relying on Filartiga, opines that the Alien Tort Claims Act
requires a more searching review of the merits to establish jurisdiction
than is required under the more flexible "arising under" language of
§ 1331. According to Kadic, there is no subject-matter jurisdiction under
§ 1350 unless "the complaint adequately pleads a violation of the law of
nations (or treaty of the United States)."' 47 Nevertheless, according to
most courts, § 1350 and its "committed in violation" language, yields
both a jurisdictional grant and a private right to sue for torts that violate
international law.
The District of Columbia Circuit does not follow the trend to inter-
pret § 1350 broadly. The three judges who wrote separate concurrences
in Tel-Oren read § 1350 slightly differently. Judge Edwards endorsed the
Second Circuit's opinion in Filartiga that § 1350 provides individuals
with a right to sue.'" He construed the statement that § 1350 did not
grant "new rights to aliens, but simply opened the federal courts for ad-
judication of the rights already recognized by international law"'149 to
mean that "aliens granted substantive rights under international law may
assert them under § 1350."110 Judge Bork, on the other hand, stated that
144. See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 E3d 232, 239 (2d Cir 1995).
145. See Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844 (11th Cir. 1996).
146. Mushikiwabo v. Barayagwiza, No. 94 CIV. 3627, 1996 WL 164496 (S.D.N.Y.
Apr. 9, 1996).
147. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 238.
148. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 780 n.5 (D.C.Cir. 1984) (Ed-
wards, J., concurring).
149. Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 887 (2d Cir. 1980).
150. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 780 n.5 (Edwards, J., concurring).
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§ 1350 does not grant individuals an explicit cause of action. Bork's rea-
sons for denying jurisdiction included that there was no evidence that
Congress intended § 1350 to authorize private causes of action and read-
ing the statute any other way would open the floodgates-a result incon-
sistent with the constitutional limits on the role of federal courts.15 ' He
maintained that a plaintiff bringing suit under § 1350 must show that the
international law or U.S. treaty upon which plaintiff relies provides a
right to sue independent of § 1350's language. Judge Robb maintained
that the other two Judges' "exhaustive" reviews of jurisdiction under
§ 1350 was unnecessary because the political question doctrine controlled
and thus the case was nonjusticiable.'52
In the instant case, the court will most likely follow the emerging
trend as evidenced in the decisions in Kadic, Marcos, Paul, Abebe-Jira
and Mushikiwabo and find that non-citizen plaintiffs have a right to sue
in a federal forum for alleged torts committed by defendant Swiss banks.
Plaintiffs Sonabend and Boruchowicz, British and Canadian citizens, re-
spectively, may be able to pursue their claims in federal court given the
trend to construe § 1350 broadly' 53 Despite the Tel-Oren opinion, federal
courts in New York have found subject matter jurisdiction over claims by
both Tutsi and Bosnian victims of human rights violations. 5 4
IV. SURVIVING POSSIBLE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES UNDER RULE 8(c)
Other possible responses to plaintiff's allegations include such af-
firmative defenses as accord and satisfaction, payment, release and res
judicata pursuant to Rule 8(c), This section addresses two 8(c) affirma-
tive defenses that appear in similar kinds of litigation-the political ques-
tion doctrine and statute of limitations-and predicts how the court
would respond to them in the lawsuits against the Swiss banks.
151. Id. at 812 (Bork, J., concurring).
152. Id. at 823 (Robb, J., concurring). See infra text accompanying notes 155-62.
153. It is ironic that under the current state of the law, aliens, but not U.S. citizens,
may bring a suit for human rights violations in U.S. courts. Plaintiffs argue that at the
time of the Holocaust, they were aliens to the United States. Nonetheless, if the court
holds that U.S. citizens may not invoke § 1331, "these Holocaust survivors will have lost
their rights to seek civil remedies in federal courts against state or private actors." Plain-
tiffs' Post-Hearing Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (filed
Aug. 29, 1997), at 17.
154. See Mushikiwabo v. Barayagwiza, No. 94 CIV. 3627, 1996 WL 164496
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 1996); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
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A. The Political Question Doctrine
In their motion for abstention, the banks argue, inter alia, that the
issues plaintiffs raise are foreign policy questions not properly subject to
judicial determination. In other words, courts should not deal with issues
constitutionally committed to other branches of government. 55 While this
doctrine prevents the judicial branch from deciding issues committed to
the legislative or executive branches, the Supreme Court maintained that
"it is error to suppose that every case or controversy which touches for-
eign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance."' '5 6
In Kadic, the Second Circuit recognized that judicial action in the
case against the Serbian despot Radovan Karadzic might create a detri-
mental effect on political relations. However, the court maintained that
not every case "implicat[ing] sensitive matters of diplomacy" is nonjusti-
ciable, and judges should not invoke the political question doctrine "to
avoid difficult and somewhat sensitive decisions in the context of human
rights." 7 The Kadic court, relying on Filartiga, stated that international
law provides judicially manageable standards for adjudicating suits under
§ 1350 and therefore the political question doctrine does not apply.' The
court believed there was no danger of interference with important gov-
ernmental interests as defendant claimed. Furthermore, the court had
written the Attorney General, asking whether the United States wished to
comment on the proceedings. The State Department replied that the polit-
ical question doctrine did not apply to these facts. 59 Based on these find-
ings, the Kadic court held that the case against defendant could proceed.
In contrast, Justice Robb's concurrence in Tel Oren v. Libyan Arab
Republic' 0° reasoned that because the lawsuit involved a terrorist attack,
judicial interference in the area of foreign relations would enter the Con-
gressional and the Executive's domain.161 Justice Robb maintained that
other branches of the national government were better equipped to deal
with terrorism. Therefore, by allowing plaintiffs in this case their day in
155. See Russell J. Weintraub, Establishing Incredible Events by Credible Evidence:
Civil Suits for Atrocities that Violate International Law, 62 BROOK. L. REv. 753 (1996).
156. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962).
157. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 249 (2d Cir. 1995).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 250. See also Klinghoffer v. Achille Lauro, 739 F. Supp. 854, 860
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (doctrine did not apply because plaintiffs' claims were in tort); Abebe-
Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 848 (11th Cir. 1996) (doctrine did not apply because action
was a tort); Paul v. Avril, 812 F. Supp. 207, 212 (S.D.Fla. 1993) (doctrine is devoid of
merit because case presents clearly justiciable issues).
160. 726 F.2d 774 (D.C.Cir. 1984).
161. Id. at 825.
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court, every alleged victim of violence around the world could mount
similar claims. 62
The Swiss banks have argued that these lawsuits should not be al-
lowed to proceed, because they will impede the Volcker Commission's
investigation into the disposition of the wartime accounts. They also as-
serted that Judge Korman should abstain from handling the case and al-
low the executive branch to resolve these issues. An attorney for the
plaintiffs duly noted that the suits involve private individuals suing pri-
vate companies. As a result, government action should not have an im-
pact on the proceedings. Another argument in support of mallowing this
litigation to proceed is that dspite the work of independent committees
and auditors, and the banks and despite the humanitarian funds that have
been set up to compensate Jewish survivors and their heirs by the Swiss
banking industry and the government, no money has changed hands.
Moreover, the offers, totaling close to a combined $5 billion, falls $15
billion short of what Jewish organizations and leaders think Holocaust
survivors and their heirs rightfully deserve. At any rate, in light of the
Second Circuit's opinion in Kadic, the court is not likely to adopt the po-
sition that the political question doctrine precludes the court from adjudi-
cating these claims.
B. Statute of Limitations
In their motions, which were filed on May 15, 1997, the defendants
did not directly broach the issue of the expired statute of limitations.
They did, howver, refer to it in general terms and argued it would be a
future point of contention. Plaintiffs in both Weisshaus and Friedman
claim that because defendant banks acted to conceal the existence of de-
posited, looted, and cloaked assets, they should be estopped from seeking
the protections the applicable statute of limitations. 163
Equitable tolling principles apply in cases where a defendant's
wrongful conduct, or extraordinary circumstances outside the plaintiff's
control prevent a plaintiff from asserting a claim timely. 64 In Forti v.
162. Id. at 826.
163. Friedman v. Union Bank of Switzerland, No. 96-5161, at 104 (E.D.N.Y. filed
Oct. 21, 1996); Weisshaus v. Union Bank of Switzerland, No. 96-4849, at 8-9 (E.D.N.Y.
amended complaint filed Jan. 24, 1997). The Weisshaus complaint states: "No statute of
limitations has begun to run on the causes of action herein since plaintiffs and the plain-
tiff class have remained in ignorance of vital information, without any fault or want of
diligence or due care on their part, essential to pursue their claims." Weisshaus, No. 96-
4849, at 8-9.
164. Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1549 (N.D.Cal. 1987), reh'g
granted, 694 F. Supp. 707 (N.D.Cal. 1988).
1997]
276 MD. JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & TRADE
Suarez-Mason, 65 Argentine citizens brought suit in a U.S. court against a
former Argentine general under the Alien Tort Claims Act.'6 The plain-
tiffs alleged that under the general's authority, military personnel had tor-
tured and detained them and murdered their family members. 67 The Ar-
gentine citizens sought relief for their injuries approximately ten years
after the alleged activity occurred.'6 The court first held that the statute
of limitations of the forum state for personal injury actions should be ap-
plied to claims under the Alien Tort Claims Act. The court also acknowl-
edged that under California law, personal injury actions must be brought
within one year of the incident.'6 They went on to assert that in order to
demonstrate that their claims are not barred, plaintiffs must "allege facts
sufficient to show a disputed question of fact as to timeliness."'' 70 The
court found that the plaintiffs presented enough evidence indicating that
they may have been denied access to the Argentine courts, thus raising
an issue of fact as to whether the limitations period was tolled.'7 ' Plain-
tiffs argued that the courts retained their powers to adjudicate civil claims
against military officers only in theory, while in reality, no relief was or
could be granted by the Argentine courts during the military's "reign of
terror. 172 According to the court, it was not necessary for plaintiffs to
"plead specific factual detail not ascertainable without discovery" to
demonstrate that their claims were not time-barred. 73 The court also
found that the equitable tolling doctrine applied during the time the
defendant was in hiding, thereby applying the "fraudulent concealment"
doctrine to situations where a defendant flees and conceals himself in or-
der to avoid being sued. 174
Similarly, in Hilao v. Estate of Marcos,1' 5 the Ninth Circuit ruled
that any action against the estate of former Philippine President Ferdi-
165. Ford, 672 F. Supp. 1531.
166. Forti, 672 F. Supp. at 1536-38.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 1549.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 1550.
172. Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1550 (N.D. Cal. 1987), reh'g
granted, 694 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Cal. 1988)
173. Id. at 1549.
174. Id. But see Handel v. Artukovic, 601 F. Supp. 1421, 1431 (C.D.Cal. 1985).
"Criminal prosecutions of crimes against humanity should be and are subject to a statute
of no limitations; but civil actions cannot be subjected to this rule under American law."
Id.
175. 103 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 1996).
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nand Marcos had tolled during his presidency. 176 The court found that the
testimony offered by plaintiffs demonstrated extraordinary conditions.
One witness testified that Marcos had gotten the legislature to pass a
constitutional amendment granting him immunity from suit during ten-
ure.' 7 Another witness testified that many victims of torture did not re-
port the abuse they suffered out of fear of reprisals. 78
Accordingly, the court could apply the "fraudulent concealment"
doctrine to the banks' situation if it finds evidence that the banks in fact
concealed essential information from plaintiffs regarding the status of
their accounts and the deposits of looted assets. The Weisshaus complaint
includes a particular story about a plaintiff's encounter with defendant
Credit Suisse. After the war, class member Estelle Sapir, acting on infor-
mation that her father shared with her before he died in a concentration
camp, contacted Credit Suisse and requested the return of all money in
her father's accounts. Credit Suisse acknowledged the existence of her
father's accounts, yet refused to return the money unless she could pro-
duce her father's death certificate. 179 Obviously, Sapir did not have and
could never obtain her father's death certificate. It seems that the Swiss
banks were purposefully demanding unreasonable documentation from
Sapir in order to deny her any money. Interestingly, Weisshaus uses this
story as evidence of the banks' active concealment of information from
class members. According to plaintiffs, by continually denying the exis-
tence of the Sapir account, and hardly making an effort to locate it, the
banks consciously acted to hide the whereabouts of Plaintiffs' assets.
Problems with the statute of limitations doctrine are evident-plain-
tiffs are suing the banks because of transactions that occurred over fifty
years ago.'8 0 However, the doctrine may not apply if plaintiffs argue that
the conspiracy to deny them their deposits is ongoing. Moreover, new in-
formation crucial to the litigation has recently surfaced at the National
Archives. Reexamining Switzerland's role during the war is more timely
now than immediately after the war given the newly released documents
176. Id. at 773.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Weisshaus v. Union Bank of Switzerland, No. 96-4849, at 4 (E.D.N.Y amended
complaint filed Jan. 24, 1997).
180. In addition to applying the "fraudulent concealment" doctrine, the Friedman
complaint alleges that defendant banks are estopped from raising the statute of limitations
defense because the "activities in concealing their common scheme and purpose to deny,
block and obstruct access to and knowledge of these assets" are ongoing. Furthermore,
defendant banks are estopped from raising the statute of limitations as a defense by oper-
ation of the doctrine of unclean hands. Friedman v. Union Bank of Switzerland, No. 96-
5161, at 104-05 (E.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 21, 1996).
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and the current investigations into Switzerland's past. If it is not too late
to uncover the truth through these special investigatory committees, it
should not be too late for claimants to achieve justice through the courts.
V. CONCLUSION
It is difficult to predict exactly how Judge Korman will rule on
these lawsuits. Analyzing how courts have dealt with similar claims in
the past is a helpful exercise. Based on prior courts' reasoning, it seems
that the court will not entertain the Friedman suit's federal question
claims of treaty violations under § 1331 but might entertain claims of in-
ternational human rights violations under § 1331. The court is even more
likely to recognize that the allegations under § 1350 provide noncitizen
plaintiffs with a private right to sue. Then, however, the problem be-
comes proving that the Swiss banks actually violated international law by
prolonging the Nazi Regime's reign of terror by hiding looted and
cloaked assets.
Diversity jurisdiction remains for plaintiffs from both suits who are
U.S. citizens. A court may determine that diversity jurisdiction supports
all counts (most of which are based in contract and fraud) in the com-
plaints. And New York courts do have personal jurisdiction over defend-
ant banks because the bank branches conduct a substantial business in
New York. However, other obstacles preventing plaintiffs from getting to
a jury include two discussed in this paper-the political question doctrine
and an expired statute of limitations-and many more that are not-such
as problems with class certification, failure to plead with sufficient par-
ticularity, and proof.
Even if plaintiffs do not succeed in court, it might not matter. These
lawsuits impose added pressure on the Swiss banks to act favorably in
light of their questionable conduct during World War II. In fact, the suits
have forced a reexamination of Switzerland's dealings with the Nazis.
They have exposed the Swiss' unfriendly postwar treatment of Holocaust
survivors and their heirs by instigating negative publicity. Plaintiffs cer-
tainly will not regain all of what they lost during the war, but they will
receive some compensation from the Swiss banks. Whatever the Swiss
banks and Swiss government decide, the result could not arrive soon
enough.
Stephanie A. Bilenker
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